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In	  late	  2010,	  the	  self-­‐immolation	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  street	  vendor	  Mohammad	  Bouazzizi	  
triggered	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings,	  the	  ramifications	  of	  which	  shaped	  the	  
nature	  of	  regional	  relations	  over	  the	  coming	  half-­‐decade.	  His	  act,	  borne	  out	  of	  socio-­‐
economic	   frustrations	   triggered	   a	   spate	   of	   protests	   that	   dramatically	   altered	   the	  
regional	   order	   and	   fragmenting	   regime-­‐society	   relations.	   Previously	   embedded	  
regimes	  were	  challenged	  and,	   in	  some	  cases,	  overthrown,	  as	   individual	  agency	  was	  
empowered.	   Regional	   dynamics	   ebbed	   and	   flowed,	   with	   revolution	   and	   counter-­‐
revolution	   taking	  place	  across	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.	  Some	  states	  were	  
more	   susceptible	   to	   the	   tides	   of	   revolution	   than	   others,	   with	   Tunisia,	   Egypt	   and	  
Yemen	  overthrowing	   autocratic	   leaders,	   to	   varying	   degrees	   of	   success.	   Regimes	   in	  
Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   across	   the	   Gulf	   broadly,	   with	   the	   notable	   exception	   of	   Bahrain,	  
were	   able	   to	   stand	   strong	   in	   the	   face	  of	   revolutionary	   currents.	   The	  events	  of	   the	  
uprisings	   seemed	   to	   legitimise	   the	   actions	  of	   certain	   actors	   across	   the	   region	  who	  
had	   long	   pursued	   a	   campaign	   of	   resistance	   to	   contemporary	   Middle	   East	   power	  
structures.	  Integral	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  many	  groups	  across	  the	  region	  were	  narratives	  
of	  resistance	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  empower	  the	  downtrodden	  of	  the	  region	  yet	  in	  the	  face	  
of	   this,	   regimes	   sought	   to	   frame	   the	   protests	   along	   sectarian	   lines,	   subject	   to	  
external	  interference.	  
	  
In	  the	  Middle	  East,	  few	  terms	  have	  evoked	  such	  poisonous	  responses	  in	  recent	  years	  
than	   sectarianism.	   Loaded	   –	   implicitly	   –	  with	   negative	   connotations,	   the	   term	   has	  
increasingly	  been	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  explaining	   the	  emergence	  of	   violence	  within	  
deeply	   divided	   societies.	   Following	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   Arab	   Uprisings	   in	   late	   2010,	  
regime-­‐society	   relations	   in	   the	   region	   have	   become	   increasingly	   fractious,	   with	  
growing	  divisions	  taking	  place	  along	  sectarian	  lines.	  With	  a	  high	  diversity	  of	  identities	  
spread	  across	  the	  region,	   few	  states	  can	   lay	  claim	  to	  religious	  or	  ethnic	  coherence,	  
resulting	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  difference	  manifesting	  in	  different	  forms.	  In	  a	  number	  
of	   cases,	   these	   differences	   were	   also	   used	   as	   a	   mechanism	   of	   control.	   Such	  
differences	  allow	  fear	  and	  prejudice	  to	  become	  dominant	  factors	  within	  domestic	  –	  
and	   regional	   –	   politics,	   while	   serving	   as	   a	   means	   through	   which	   regimes	   can	  
(re)construct	  societal	  relations	  and	  security	  dynamics.	  	  	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  small	  –	  yet	  burgeoning	  –	  academic	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  sectarianism	  
(in	  the	  Middle	  East),	  which	  also	  touches	  on	  broader	  questions	  of	  identity.	  A	  number	  
of	  scholars	  have	  produced	  highly	  commendable	  works	  looking	  at	  this	  issue,	  yet	  these	  
are	   typically	   undertaken	   within	   the	   context	   of	   a	   state	   or	   region.	   At	   the	   heart	   of	  
discussions	   of	   sectarianism	   are	   questions	   about	   identity	   construction,	   resulting	   in	  
debates	  as	   to	  whether	   identities	  are	  primordial	  or	  constructed,	  with	   the	  answer	   to	  
this	  question	  revealing	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  sectarianism.	  Primordialists	  
would	   argue	   that	   identities	   are	   ontologically	   given	   and	   fixed	   through	   biological	  
factors	  coupled	  with	  territorial	  locations.	  Social	  norms	  and	  traditions	  then	  reinforce	  
these	  identities.	  	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  constructivist	  approach	  instead	  suggests	  that	  identities	  are	  imagined	  
and	   constructed	   entities.	   They	   do	   so	   by	   building	   upon	   the	   work	   of	   Benedict	  
Anderson,	   whose	   Imagined	   Communities	   advances	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   political	  
community	   is	   an	   imagined	   construct,	   a	   product	   of	   modernity	   that	   was	   a	  
consequence	  of	   “print	   capitalism”,	  which	   facilitated	   a	   group	  of	   people	   to	   coalesce	  
around	  a	  shared	  vernacular.	  As	  Anderson	  argues,	  a	  nation	  “is	  imagined	  because	  the	  
members	  of	  even	  the	  smallest	  nation	  will	  never	  know	  most	  of	  their	  fellow-­‐members,	  
meet	  them,	  or	  even	  hear	  of	  them,	  yet	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  each	  lives	  the	  image	  of	  their	  
communion”	  (Anderson,	  1983,	  pp67).	  To	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  sectarianism	  within	  
society,	  one	  must	  consider	  these	  different	  ontological	  positions,	  while	  understanding	  
that	  within	  political	  dimensions,	   sectarian	   identities	  are	  malleable	  entities	   that	  are	  
often	  used	  for	  political	  ends.	  	  
	  
One	   point	   of	   agreement	   across	   an	   increasingly	   fractious	   literature	   is	   that	  
membership	  of	  a	  sect	  involves	  being	  part	  of	  a	  group	  with	  a	  shared	  identity,	  belief	  or	  
ideology	   which	   can	   separate	   them	   from	   society.	   For	   some,	   such	   as	   Ismael	   and	  
Ismael,	   the	   negative	   connotations	   bound	   up	   within	   sectarianism	   mean	   that	   a	  
“generation	  of	  animus	  and	  feelings	  of	  exclusion	  between	  individuals	  and	  groups	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  attaching	  negative	  meanings	  to	  group	  traits”	  (Ismael	  and	  Ismael,	  2010,	  
p340).	  Whilst	  initially	  conceived	  as	  religious	  difference,	  in	  recent	  years	  the	  term	  has	  
begun	  to	  include	  ethnic	  and	  political	  minorities.	  Such	  approaches	  tend	  to	  focus	  upon	  
the	  political	  manifestation	  of	  sectarian	  difference,	  and	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  violence	  
can	  arise	  from	  a	  range	  of	  discrepancies	  and	  perceptions,	  yet	  there	  are	  other	  possible	  
ways	   of	   engaging	  with	   the	   topic.	   It	   is	   therefore	   increasingly	   important	   to	   do	   so	   in	  
light	  of	  recent	  events	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  expanding	  the	  understanding	  of	  this	  term	  can	  
aid	   the	   analysis	   of	   violent	   conflicts	   that	   are	   shaping	   the	  Middle	   East.	   Perhaps	   the	  
most	  important	  aspect	  here	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  sovereign	  nation	  state	  –	  the	  
bedrock	   of	   a	   number	   of	   International	   Relations	   approaches	   –	   and	   the	   sect,	  which	  
may	  not	  necessarily	  correspond	  with	  the	  territorial	  borders	  of	  states	   in	   the	  region.	  
Indeed,	   the	  power	  of	   sectarian	   identities	   is	  often	  a	   source	  of	  contestation	   to	  state	  
power,	   especially	   when	   located	   within	   broader	   geopolitical	   struggles	   that	   have	  
adopted	  sectarian	  dimensions.	  
	  
Regardless	  of	  whether	  sectarianism	  is	  related	  exclusively	  to	  religious	  differences	  or	  is	  
expanded	   to	   include	  political	   and	  ethnic	  diversity	   as	  well,	   the	  power	  of	  discourses	  
that	   arise	   from	   it	   still	   needs	   to	   be	   examined.	   Reese	   (2013,	   p6)	   stresses	   that,	   as	  
sectarian	  narratives	  offer	  a	  deeply	  emotional	  unifying	  point	  for	  popular	  mobilization,	  
these	  sentiments	  are	  often	  polarised	  by	  “weak”	  regimes	  and	  external	  actors	  involved	  
in	  conflict	  as	  a	  way	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  States	  weaknesses	  and	  failings	  are	  found	  
to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  (political)	  community	  by	  encouraging	  the	  resort	  to	  identities	  that	  
do	  not	  correspond	  to	  those	  of	  the	  nation	  state,	  these	  being	  tribes,	  ethnicities,	  sects,	  
or	   even	   political	   parties/religious	   organizations.	   It	   follows	   that	   when	   a	   rise	   in	  
sectarian	   violence	   occurs	   it	   poses	   an	   existential	   threat	   to	   these	   states	   and,	  
particularly	   in	   the	  case	  of	   contemporary	   sectarian	  conflicts,	   sectarianism	  has	   to	  be	  
understood	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  political	  conflict	  rather	  than	  exclusively	  as	  a	  cause.	  This	  
is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   sectarian	  motivations	   can	  not	   be	  used	   in	   instances	  of	  
pre-­‐emptive	   violence,	   which	   further	   fuel	   a	   cycle	   of	   violence	   and	   perceived	   state	  
illegitimacy	   that	   can	   lead	   citizens	   to	   identify	  with	   sub	   and	   trans	   identity	   groups	   in	  
their	  quest	  to	  find	  some	  security	  (ibid).	  
	  
This	  expanded	  understanding	  of	  sectarianism	  is	  key	  in	  looking	  at	  the	  current	  events	  
and	   conflicts	   that	   are	   taking	   place	   across	   the	   region.	   Historically	   speaking,	   the	  
diverse	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  compositions	  of	  states	  such	  as	  Lebanon,	  Iraq,	  and	  Syria	  
have	   created	   prime	   conditions	   for	   instances	   of	   sectarian	   violence	   to	   arise,	   and	   to	  
very	  quickly	   transform	   into	  protracted	  and	   intractable	   conflicts.	   Sectarian	  divisions	  
that	  are	  being	  exploited	  by	  both	  states	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  today	  draw	  on	  centuries	  
old	  political,	   religious,	  and	  ethnic	   tensions,	  which	  over	   time	  have	  developed	   into	  a	  
plethora	   of	   intersectional	   identities	   that	   transcend	   nation	   states	   and	   territories.	  
Recent	  years	  have	  witnessed	  the	  exploitation	  of	  these	  identities	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  by	  
various	  dominant	  states	  in	  the	  region.	  Sectarian	  violence	  has	  come	  to	  be	  at	  the	  core	  
of	  regional	  geopolitics	  and	  foreign	  policies	  of	  contending	  states,	  and	   is	   increasingly	  
being	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   balance	   competing	   hegemonies	   and	   proxy	   conflicts	   and	  
actors	  through	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  This	  comes	  with	  a	  painstakingly	  high	  humanitarian	  
cost,	  which	  newer	  manifestations	  of	  sectarian	  violence	  keep	  on	  a	  constant	  rise.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	   it	   is	   fundamental	   to	  widen	  our	  understanding	  of	  sectarianism	  and	  of	   its	  
manifestation	   and	   implications	   in	   order	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   what	   is	   currently	  
happening	  in	  the	  region,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  this	  edited	  collection’s	  main	  aims.	  As	  outline	  
above,	  although	  violence	  between	  people	  of	  different	  sects	  had	  long	  occurred	  across	  
the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  emergence	  of	  Da’ish	  in	  2014	  has	  made	  violence	  with	  a	  sectarian	  
motivation	  more	   prominent	   in	   discourses	   surrounding	   the	   region.	   As	   a	   result,	   this	  
has	  also	  brought	  a	  certain	  manifestation	  of	  sectarian	  violence	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  
media	  worldwide,	  which	  has	   fostered	  contemporary	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  term	  
and	   its	   significance.	   In	   the	   case	  of	  Da’ish,	   the	   group’s	   fundamentalist	   Salafi	   vision,	  
with	  many	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  Wahhabist	  ideology	  found	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  is	  vociferously	  
anti-­‐Shi’a	   and	   to	   this	   end,	   has	   sought	   to	   kill	   Shi’a	   Muslims	   and	   destroy	   sites	   of	  
religious	   importance	   for	   the	   Shi’a.	  While	   this	   might	   seem	   to	   conform	   to	   a	   classic	  
understanding	   of	   sectarianism	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	   which	   dates	   the	   outbreak	   of	  
violence	   back	   to	   the	   Sunni-­‐Sh’ia	   schism	   following	   the	   death	   of	   the	   Prophet,	   the	  
implications	  of	  Da’ish’s	  emergence	  are	  undeniably	  modern	  in	  nature.	  The	  brutalities	  
perpetrated	  by	   the	   self-­‐asserted	   Islamic	   State	   have	   come	  with	   drastic	   implications	  
for	   the	   region’s	   already	   fragile	   geopolitical	   equilibrium,	  bringing	  old	   struggles	  over	  
hegemony	  and	  proxy	  actors	  back	  to	  the	  fore.	  
	  
This	   is	  particularly	   the	  case	   for	  Hizballah,	   the	  Lebanese	  Party	  of	  God	  which,	  having	  
seized	  vast	  swathes	  of	  territory	  across	  Syria	  and	  Iraq	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2014,	  
would	   become	   increasingly	   active,	   defending	   the	   Shi’a	   in	   Iraq,	   Syria	   and	   Lebanon.	  
Speaking	  after	   the	  seizure	  of	  Mosul,	  Hizballah’s	   leader	  Hassan	  Nasrallah	  warned	  of	  
the	  dangers	  posed	  by	  Da’ish.	  
We	  have	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  real	  existential	  danger	  threatening	  us	  all	  and	  it	  is	  
not	   a	   joke	   […]	   This	   danger	   does	   not	   recognise	   Shias,	   Sunnis,	   Muslims,	   Christians,	  
Druze,	  Yazidis,	  Arabs	  or	  Kurds.	  This	  monster	  is	  growing	  and	  getting	  bigger	  […]I	  call	  on	  
every	   Lebanese,	   Palestinian,	   Iraqi,	   Syrian	   and	   any	   Gulf	   national	   to	   leave	   sectarian	  
intolerance	   behind	   and	   think	   that	   this	   phenomenon	   is	   not	   a	   threat	   against	   Shias	  
only.	  No	  one	  should	  regard	  this	  battle	  as	  a	  sectarian	  one,	   it	   is	  a	   takfiri	  war	  against	  
anyone	  who	  opposed	  it.	  (Nasrallah,	  15.08.14)	  	  
Despite	   Nasrallah’s	   calls,	   conflict	   in	   Syria	   and	   Iraq	   increasingly	   took	   place	   along	  
sectarian	   lines,	   with	   external	   actors	   such	   as	   Iran	   and	   Saudi	   Arabia	   sensing	   an	  
opportunity	   to	   lay	   claim	   to	   greater	   geopolitical	   influence	   across	   the	   region.	   This	  
quest	  for	  geopolitical	  influence	  between	  Tehran	  and	  Riyadh	  has	  become	  increasingly	  
influential	   in	   recent	   years,	   as	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   states	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  
Arab	  Uprisings	  has	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  the	  two	  states	  to	  exert	  influence	  and	  
support	  sectarian	  kin	  across	  the	  region.	  The	  roots	  of	  this	  rivalry	  are	  important	  to	  our	  
project,	  demonstrating	  the	  potential	  regional	  consequences	  of	  sectarian	  divisions.	  	  
	  
In	   a	   similar	  manner,	   the	   revolution	   in	   Iran	   that	   established	   the	   Islamic	  Republic	   in	  
1979	   would	   also	   bring	   religion	   into	   geopolitical	   considerations	   across	   the	   Middle	  
East.	   The	   revolution	   tore	   up	   regional	   relations	   as	   they	   had	   previously	   been	   and	  
empowered	  previously	  downtrodden	  Shi’a	  groups	  across	  the	  region,	  most	  notably	  in	  
Lebanon	  with	   the	   formation	   of	   aforementioned	   Hizballah.	   The	   Islamic	   Republic	   of	  
Iran,	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   Ayatollah	   Ruhollah	   Khomeini,	   would	   embark	   on	   a	  
proactive	  foreign	  policy	  that	  positioned	  themselves	  at	  the	  vanguard	  of	  protecting	  the	  
umma	  and,	  although	  Khomeini	  initially	  sought	  to	  frame	  the	  revolution	  –	  and	  indeed	  
Iran’s	  role	  as	  protector	  –	  in	  non-­‐sectarian	  terms,	  the	  political	  dimensions	  of	  regional	  
security	  would	  result	  in	  the	  manifestation	  of	  sectarian	  tensions.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result,	   a	   schism	   between	   Iran	   and	   Saudi	   Arabia	   –	   the	   state	   that	   had	   derived	  
legitimacy	  from	  being	  the	  protector	  of	   Islam’s	  two	  holiest	  places–	  quickly	  emerged	  
and	   spread	   across	   the	   region	   (Mabon,	   2013),	   and	   sites	   of	   proxy	   competition	  
emerged	   where	   states	   were	   home	   to	   delicate	   sectarian	   balances.	   The	   two	   then	  
provided	   support	   to	   their	   sectarian	   kin,	   although	   there	   are	   complex	   relationships	  
between	  groups	  across	  the	  region	  and	  their	  external	  sponsors	  and	  to	  reduce	  these	  
relationships	   to	  sectarian	  driven	  patron-­‐client	   interactions	  would	  be	  to	  deny	  group	  
agency.	  	  
	  
Within	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  a	  vocal	  Shi’a	  minority	  resides,	  predominantly	  within	  the	  Eastern	  
Province,	  yet	  in	  neighbouring	  Bahrain	  –	  separated	  by	  the	  short	  King	  Fahd	  Causeway	  
–	  a	  Shi’a	  majority	  is	  ruled	  by	  a	  Sunni	  minority	  and	  seen	  by	  many	  to	  be	  the	  ‘epicentre	  
of	  a	  sectarian	  competition’.	  The	  archipelago	  of	  Bahrain	  has	  a	  population	  of	  around	  
1.2	  million	  people	  yet	  only	  around	  50%	  of	  this	  number	  are	  Bahraini.	  The	  Shi’a	  of	  the	  
country	   have	   long	   endured	   political	   marginalisation	   and	   economic	  
disenfranchisement,	  stemming	  predominantly	  from	  efforts	  by	  the	  Sunni	  ruling	  family	  
to	  maintain	  control.	  One	  such	  way	  of	  doing	  this	  is	  to	  locate	  the	  ‘Shi’a	  threat’	  within	  
broader	   regional	   security	   narratives	   of	   Iranian	   interference.	   The	   opposite	   can	   be	  
found	  in	  Syria,	  where	  a	  Shi’a	  minority	  rules	  over	  a	  Sunni	  majority.	  Of	  course	  in	  both	  
states	   –	   and	   across	   the	   region	   generally	   –	   the	   construction	   of	   identity	   is	   far	  more	  
complex	  than	  such	  binary	  distinctions	  initially	  suggest,	  with	  economic,	  tribal,	  ethnic,	  
regional	  and	  familial	  factors	  all	  feeding	  into	  the	  identity	  melanges.	  	  	  
	  
The	  onset	  of	  violence	  in	  Syria	  and	  Bahrain,	  although	  initially	  occurring	  against	  ruling	  
elites	   with	   greater	   calls	   for	   democratic	   participation,	   were	   quickly	   constructed	   in	  
such	  a	  way	  to	  bring	  sectarian	  difference	  to	  the	  fore	  as	  a	  method	  of	  ensuring	  control.	  
In	  the	  following	  months	  and	  years,	  divisions	  within	  both	  states	  have	  deepened	  and	  
violence	  (both	  direct	  and	  structural)	  has	  come	  to	  characterised	  politics.	  Meanwhile,	  
a	   nationalist	   sentiment	   is	   often	   mobilised	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   circumvent	   domestic	  
tensions,	   by	   locating	   the	   sectarian	   ‘threat’	   within	   broader	   geopolitical	   problems,	  
which	  serves	  to	  ensure	  the	  support	  of	  regional	  rivalries.	  	  
	  
Since	   1979,	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   Iran	   have	   increasingly	   been	  
viewed	  –	  incorrectly	  –	  through	  a	  sectarian	  lens,	  often	  overlooking	  –	  or	  ignoring	  –	  real	  
politik	   and	   domestic	   factors.	   Debate	   about	   the	   nature	   and	   characteristics	   of	   this	  
rivalry	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	   prevalent,	   yet	   the	   wider	   repercussions	   of	   the	  
instrumentalised	  use	  of	   Islam	  within	  political	  contexts	  are	  becoming	  prominent.	  All	  
too	   often,	   such	   differences	   are	   understood	   as	   being	   a	   result	   of	   sectarian	   divisions	  
within	  divided	  societies,	  grouping	  together	  a	  multifarious	  range	  of	  differences	  under	  
one	  term,	  which	  appears	   increasingly	  problematic.	  Understanding	  the	  rivalry	   is	  one	  
example	   of	   the	   prominence	   of	   sectarian	   discourses	   as	   a	   means	   of	   engaging	   with	  
Middle	  Eastern	  politics.	  	  
	  
Perhaps	   the	   most	   obvious	   example	   of	   a	   state	   that	   has	   been	   characterised	   by	  
sectarian	   difference	   and	   shaped	   by	   regional	   actors	   is	   Iraq,	   where	   a	   lack	   of	  
congruence	  between	  ‘nation’	  and	  ‘state’	  has	  posed	  challenges	  to	  domestic	  stability.	  
A	  number	  of	  scholars	  have	  engaged	  with	  sectarian	  dynamics	  within	  the	   Iraqi	  state,	  
perhaps	   the	  best	   example	  of	  which	   is	   the	  work	  of	   Fanar	  Haddad.	  Haddad	   stresses	  
that	  sectarianism,	  while	  important,	  should	  not	  be	  overemphasised	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
other	  factors.	  Indeed,	  Haddad	  suggests	  that	  sectarianism	  is	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  “the	  
mutually	  antagonistic	  other	  of	  national	  identity”	  (Haddad,	  2013,	  p116),	  yet	  this	  gives	  
far	   too	   much	   credence	   to	   sectarian	   dynamics.	   Khalil	   Osman	   (2014)	   and	   other	  
scholars	  such	  as	  Charles	  Tripp	  (2007),	  Liam	  Anderson	  and	  Gareth	  Stansfield	  (2004),	  
Adeed	  Dawisha	   (2009),	  and	  Toby	  Dodge	   (2005)	  all	  engage	  with	  sectarian	  dynamics	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  questions	  about	  stability	  within	  Iraq.	  In	  The	  Origins	  of	  
ISIS	  Simon	  Mabon	  and	  Stephen	  Royle	  (2016)	  look	  at	  the	  conditions	  that	  have	  helped	  
Sunni	  extremism	  to	   thrive,	  particularly	   focussing	  upon	  the	   importance	  of	   identities	  
within	   Iraq,	  and	  how	  the	  politicisation	  and	  marginalisation	  of	  such	   identities	   (tribal	  
and	  religious)	  has	  fed	  into	  these	  conditions.	  Others,	  such	  as	  Lawrence	  Potter	  (2013)	  
and	  Toby	  Matthiessen	  (2013)	  have	  look	  at	  sectarian	  dynamics	  across	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  
broadly,	  identifying	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics	  that	  exist	  in	  Iraq	  but	  also	  across	  the	  
region.	  	  
	  
Sectarian	  divisions	  in	  Iraq	  have	  ramifications	  for	  a	  range	  of	  other	  issues	  in	  the	  state,	  
notably	  instances	  of	  violence	  along	  sectarian	  lines	  but	  also,	  given	  the	  prominence	  of	  
religion	   in	   the	   state,	   it	  has	  also	  become	  politicised	   formally	  and	   informally.	  Within	  
the	  context	  of	  a	  fragmenting	  Iraqi	  state,	  the	  2003	  US-­‐led	  invasion	  is	  often	  heralded	  
as	  a	  root	  of	  recent	  troubles,	  as	  the	  deba’athification	  process	  designed	  to	  prevent	  the	  
party	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	   regaining	  power	   left	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	  unemployed	  
and	   struggling	   to	  meet	   their	   basic	   needs	   (Mabon	   and	   Royle,	  Op.	   Cit).	   Prior	   to	   the	  
invasion,	  the	  legacy	  of	  sanctions	  had	  restricted	  the	  ability	  of	  social	  structures	  to	  fulfil	  
their	   designated	   role.	   Within	   the	   context	   of	   this	   struggle	   and	   the	   increasingly	  
politicised	   religious	   identities	   across	   Iraq,	   tribal	   and	   religious	   divisions	   became	  
increasingly	   violent.	   Moreover,	   existing	   within	   the	   context	   of	   a	   US-­‐led	   counter	  
insurgency	  operation	  and	  rising	  Sunni	  extremism	  –	  at	  this	  time	  Al	  Qa’ida	  in	  Iraq,	  the	  
forerunner	  of	  Da’ish,	   led	  by	  Abu	  Musa	  al	  Zarqawi	  –	   Iraqis	  faced	  uncertainty	  from	  a	  
number	  of	  different	  sources.	  This	  violence	  was	  simplistically	  framed	  as	  sectarian,	  yet	  
such	   an	   approach	   overestimates	   the	   power	   of	   religious	   identity	   whilst	  
underestimating	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  range	  of	  other	  factors.	  	  
	  
As	  an	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  report	  notes,	  such	  practices	  were	  also	  employed	  by	  
the	  government	  in	  Baghdad:	  
	  
Prime	  Minister	  Nouri	  al-­‐Maliki	  has	  implemented	  a	  divide-­‐and-­‐conquer	  strategy	  that	  
has	   neutered	   any	   credible	   Sunni	   Arab	   leadership.	   The	   authorities	   also	   have	   taken	  
steps	   that	   reinforce	   perceptions	   of	   a	   sectarian	   agenda.	   Prominent	   officials	   –	  
predominantly	   Sunni	   –	   have	   been	   cast	   aside	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Justice	   and	  
accountability	  Law	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  alleged	  senior-­‐level	  affiliation	  to	  the	  former	  Baath	  
party.	  Federal	  security	   forces	  have	  disproportionately	  deployed	   in	  Baghdad’s	  Sunni	  
neighbourhoods	   as	   well	   as	   Sunni-­‐populated	   governorates	   (Anbar,	   Salah	   al-­‐Din,	  
Ninew,	  Kirkuk	  and	  Diyala).	  Al-­‐Iraqiya,	   the	  political	  movement	  to	  which	  Sunni	  Arabs	  
most	   readily	   related,	   slowly	   came	   apart	   due	   to	   internal	   rivalries	   even	   as	   Maliki	  
resorted	  to	  both	  legal	  and	  extra-­‐judicial	  means	  to	  consolidate	  power.	  (International	  
Crisis	  Group,	  2013)	  
	  
Supporting	   this	   were	   the	   emergence	   of	   Shi’a	   militias	   –	   later	   Popular	  Mobilization	  
Units	   –	   who	   were	   typically	   violent	   organisations	   that	   used	   this	   violence	  
instrumentally	  against	  Sunnis	  across	  the	  state	  (Mabon	  and	  Royle,	  Op.	  Cit).	  The	  threat	  
of	  such	  violence	  was	  often	  used	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  control,	  a	  means	  of	  regulating	   life	  
across	  the	  state,	  emerging	  from	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  histories.	  	  
	  
Within	   this	   environment,	   Sunni	   Iraqis	   struggled	   to	   meet	   their	   basic	   needs	   and	   to	  
ensure	  their	  survival	  as	  religious	  differences	  became	  increasingly	  violent.	  For	  young	  
Sunnis	  this	  was	  no	  different.	  Another	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  report	  reads:	  	  
	  
Young	   Sunnis	   share	   the	   concerns	   of	   all	   young	   Iraqis,	   as	   they	   see	   the	   government	  
operating	   in	   slow	  motion	   only.	   But,	   beyond	   that,	   they	   also	   feel	   that	   they	   do	   not	  
enjoy	   the	  same	  opportunities	  as	  others.	  They	  have	  yet	   to	   feel	  accepted	  by	   society	  
and	   resent	  being	  suspected	  of	  affiliation	  with	  al-­‐Qaeda	   (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  
2006).	  
	  
Sectarian	  sentiments	  became	  embedded	  within	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  state,	  with	  the	  
police	   routinely	   engaging	   in	   violence	   along	   sectarian	   lines,	   which,	   all	   too	   often,	  
resulted	   in	  detention,	   torture	   and	  widespread	   violence	   routinely	  being	   carried	  out	  
against	  Sunni	  Arabs	  in	  Iraq.	  Such	  conditions	  had	  a	  deleterious	  impact	  upon	  economic	  
life	  across	  Iraq,	  with	  Sunnis	  particularly	  badly	  hit.	  In	  the	  years	  following	  the	  invasion,	  
political	   life	   across	   Iraq	  was	   characterised	   by	   suspicion.	   Significant	   questions	  were	  
asked	  as	   to	   the	  “loyalties	  of	  some	   Iraqi	  units	  –	  specifically,	  whether	   they	  will	   carry	  
out	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  national	  goals	   instead	  of	  a	  sectarian	  agenda”	   (Baker	  and	  
Hamilton,	  2006).	  Such	  concerns	  would	  undermine	  faith	  in	  the	  very	  institutions	  of	  the	  
state.	  Shi’a	  militias	  would,	  in	  return,	  use	  the	  threat	  of	  increasing	  Sunni	  militancy	  and	  
insurgency	  to	  extend	  their	  influence	  and	  reach.	  
	  
The	   oversimplification	   of	   identities	   within	   the	   context	   of	   binary	   divisions	   was	   not	  
helped	  by	  the	  penetration	  of	  Iraq	  by	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran,	  both	  of	  whom	  sought	  to	  
shape	   the	   future	  of	   the	  state	   in	  a	  way	   that	  would	  best	   suit	   their	   interests.	   In	  a	  US	  
diplomatic	  cable	  released	  by	  Wikileaks,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  urged	  the	  US	  to	  maintain	  their	  
influence	  until	  Iraqi	  sovereignty	  had	  been	  restored,	  	  
	  
otherwise	   it	  will	   be	  vulnerable	   to	   the	   Iranians.	  He	   said	   the	  Saudis	  will	   not	   support	  
one	  Iraqi	  group	  over	  the	  others	  and	  that	  the	  Kingdom	  is	  working	  for	  a	  united	  Iraq.	  
However,	  he	  warned	  that,	  if	  the	  U.S.	  leaves	  precipitously,	  the	  Saudis	  will	  stand	  with	  
the	  Sunnis.	  (06RIYADH9175_a	  2006)	  
	  
King	   Abdullah	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia	   would	   also	   suggest	   that	   al	   Maliki	   was	   an	   “Iranian	  
agent”	   (09RIYADH447_a,	   2009),	   further	   supporting	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   had	  
been	   penetrated	   by	   external	   actors	   along	   sectarian	   lines.	   What	   quickly	   became	  
apparent	  with	  regard	  to	  foreign	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  was	  that	  although	  other	  factors	  
were	  on	  the	  surface,	  sectarian	  divisions	  were	  lurking	  beneath	  the	  surface	  and	  could	  
be	  mobilised	  given	  the	  right	  circumstances.	  Following	  the	  uprisings	  in	  Syria,	  the	  two	  
states	   once	   more	   attempted	   to	   shape	   the	   region	   in	   their	   image,	   with	   sectarian	  
schisms	   playing	   a	   more	   prominent	   role	   within	   the	   civil	   war.	   Such	   concerns	   have	  
begun	  to	  characterise	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics,	  albeit	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  
self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy.	  
	  
As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this,	   and	   with	   an	   ever	   growing	   literature	   on	   Iraq	   that	   also	  
engages	   with	   questions	   about	   Political	   Violence	   and	   Western	   intervention,	   our	  
special	  issue	  leaves	  the	  question	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  to	  others	  and	  focuses	  upon	  other	  
case	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  broaden	  understandings	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  sectarianism.	  Of	  
course,	   the	   danger	   is	   to	   overstate	   the	   power	   of	   sectarian	   identities	   and	   to	   frame	  
such	   identities	   within	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   Manichean	   dichotomy	   against	   the	  
national	  identity,	  a	  claim	  which	  is	  often	  part	  of	  analysis,	  yet	  one	  must	  be	  careful	  to	  
avoid	  essentialising	  domestic	  affairs	  to	  a	  struggle	  between	  two	  identities.	  Rather,	  it	  
is	  the	  interaction	  of	  identities	  within	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  contexts	  that	  helps	  to	  
understand	  interaction;	  after	  all,	  agency	  is	  fluid	  and	  complex.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   edited	   collection,	   the	   understanding	   of	  
sectarianism	   as	   a	   concept	   goes	   beyond	   the	   conventional	   reference	   to	   religious	   or	  
ethnic	   minorities,	   and	   includes	   “the	   tendency	   to	   undermine	   social	   cohesion	   by	  
pushing	   for	   the	   reproduction	  of	  ancient	  beliefs	  and	  separations”	   (ibid).	   In	  essence,	  
this	   understanding	   of	   sectarianism	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   all	   those	  
practices	   that	   turn	   difference	   into	   conflicts,	   and	   that	   politicises	   and	   weaponises	  
notions	  of	  identity	  to	  create	  divisions	  between	  the	  “sectarian	  self”	  and	  “the	  other”.	  
	  
Our	   special	   issue	   seeks	   to	   do	   something	   different,	   broadening	   the	   term	   beyond	   a	  
narrow	  definition.	  Much	  like	  others	  have	  sought	  to	  do	  with	  terms	  such	  as	  violence,	  
conflict	   and	   peace,	   we	   suggest	   that	   broader	   understandings	   of	   the	   term	   are	  
important,	   which,	   in	   turn,	   also	   challenge	   the	   ontological	   assumptions	   that	   are	  
inherent	   within	   narrower	   definitions.	   It	   returns	   sectarianism	   to	   a	   pure	   sense	   of	  
difference,	  removing	  the	  baggage	  that	  goes	  alongside	  it	  and	  seeks	  to	  show	  how	  the	  
term	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  manifestation	  of	  difference	  within	  a	  number	  of	  contexts.	  It	  
does	   this	   by	   applying	   the	   concept	   to	   10	   different	   case	   studies,	   within	   individual	  
states,	  but	  also	  at	  a	  regional	  level	  and	  possesses	  an	  implicit	  comparative	  dimension.	  
The	  interaction	  of	  these	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis	  facilitates	  a	  greater	  awareness	  of	  
Middle	   Eastern	   politics	   and	   this	   is	   often	   driven	   by	   (the	   perception	   of)	   sectarian	  
difference.	  We	  consider	  how	  sectarian	  differences	  can	  shape	  political,	  economic	  and	  
security	  contexts,	  while	  also	  questioning	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  concept	   itself	  can	  
be	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   securitization.	   To	   this	   end,	   we	   look	   at	   the	   dynamics	   of	  
sectarianism	  within	   states	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	   such	  differences	  upon	  political	  
and	  economic	  stability.	  We	  explore	  the	  importance	  of	  sectarian	  difference	  between	  
states,	  to	  explain	  foreign	  policy,	  whilst	  also	  serving	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  legitimisation.	  	  
	  
The	   project	  was	   born	   out	   of	   conversations	   that	   took	   place	   in	  WOCMES	   2014	   and	  
following	  this,	  a	  workshop	  was	  held	  at	  Lancaster	  University	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2015,	  
when	   invited	  speakers	  were	  asked	   to	  present	  on	   the	  sectarian	  dimensions	  of	   their	  
research.	  The	  organisers	  were	  looking	  for	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  contexts	  and	  approaches	  
and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  did	  not	  impose	  ontological	  or	  epistemological	  positions,	  we	  
did	  not	  require	  participants	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  particular	  methodological	  framework,	  nor	  
did	   we	   impose	   a	   definition	   of	   sectarianism.	   The	   results	   of	   this	   workshop	   are	  
presented	  in	  this	  volume	  and	  they	  demonstrate	  the	  wide-­‐ranging	  application	  of	  the	  
term,	   along	  with	   it,	   the	   possibility	   that	   is	   also	   inherent	  within	   it.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	  
special	   issue	   is	   comprised	   of	   8	   chapters	   that	   explore	   the	   manifestation	   of	  
sectarianism	  within	  different	  contexts	  and	  in	  different	  guises.	  A	  key	  factor	  that	  cuts	  
across	   a	   number	   of	   these	   chapters	   is	   the	   tension	   between	   endogenous	   and	  
exogenous	  factors	  and	  consequences	  of	  sectarian	  tensions	  emerging.	  	  
	  
We	  begin	   the	   special	   issue	  with	   a	  discussion	  of	   sectarianism	  within	   the	   context	  of	  
political	  violence.	  Gilbert	  Ramsay	  explores	  the	  use	  of	  sectarian	  imagery	  within	  Da’ish	  
messages,	  and	  assess	  the	  claim	  that	  perpetrators	  of	  mass	  killings	  de-­‐humanise	  their	  
victims	   to	   justify	   their	   own	   atrocities.	   By	   taking	   into	   consideration	   psychological	  
theories	  of	  dehumanisation,	  he	  argues	  for	  a	  more	  complex	  understanding	  of	  notions	  
of	   humanity	   and	   inhumanity	   in	   the	   legitimisation	   of	   violence.	   Lucia	   Ardovini	  
considers	  the	  use	  of	  Islam	  as	  a	  means	  of	  gaining	  legitimacy	  and	  control	  within	  Egypt.	  
Although	  the	  Egyptian	  population	  are	  largely	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  Ardovini	  suggests	  that	  
referring	  to	  Islam	  is	  a	  technique	  through	  which	  difference	  is	  constructed	  as	  a	  means	  
of	   alienation.	   Nicola	  Mathie’s	   article	   explores	   sectarianism	  within	   Judaism,	   with	   a	  
particular	   focus	   upon	   tensions	   between	   the	   state	   and	   settler	   groups	   who	   have	   a	  
view	  of	   Judaism	  and	  Zionism	  that	   is	  often	   in	   tension	  with	  the	  state	  narrative.	  Such	  
tensions	  have	  clear	  ramifications	  upon	  security	  and	  territory	   in	  Israel	  and	  the	  West	  
Bank.	  
	  
Lebanon	   is	   a	   state	   that	   is	   often	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   sectarian	   demographics,	  
having	  endured	  a	  15	   year	   long	   civil	  war	   and	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	   consociational	  
political	   system	   designed	   to	   provide	   political	   access	   to	   these	   groups.	   Given	   the	  
importance	  of	  sectarianism	  within	  Lebanon,	  two	  chapters	  look	  at	  different	  aspects	  of	  
politics	   in	  the	  state.	  Hannes	  Baumann	  explores	  the	   link	  between	  social	  protest	  and	  
the	   political	   economy	   of	   sectarianism	   in	   Lebanon.	   He	   argues	   that	   sectarianism	   is	  
manifested	   through	   the	   appropriation	   and	   redistribution	   of	   wealth	   by	   sectarian	  
elites	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  focuses	  on	  how	  trade	  unions	  became	  the	  main	  challengers	  
of	   such	   policies	   in	   the	   1990s.	   Abbas	   Assi	   explores	   the	   manifestation	   of	   sectarian	  
differences	  within	   the	   consociational	   system	  of	   Lebanese	   politics	   in	   the	   post-­‐2005	  
period.	   Taking	   into	   account	   the	   impact	   of	   intra	   and	   inter-­‐sectarian	   conflicts	   and	  
external	   factors	   on	   Christian	   parties	   in	   Lebanon,	   this	   paper	   looks	   at	   how	   that	   has	  
influenced	  the	  pursuit	  of	  personal	  and	  community	  interests.	  	  
	  
The	  following	  three	  chapters	  engage	  with	  the	  move	  between	  internal	  and	  external,	  
as	  domestic	  actions	  have	  repercussions	  at	  the	  regional	  (and	  international)	  level,	  and	  
vice	   versa.	   Sossie	   Kasbarian	   and	   Simon	   Mabon	   focus	   upon	   Bahrain	   and	   the	  
construction	   of	   sectarian	   master	   narratives	   as	   a	   means	   of	   framing	   conflicts	   and	  
locating	   tensions	   within	   broader	   geopolitical	   concerns.	   By	   establishing	   a	   master	  
narrative,	  Kasbarian	  and	  Mabon	  stress	  that	  the	  regime	  was	  able	  to	  circumvent	  other	  
factors	   that	   had	   fed	   into	   domestic	   unrest.	   Nina	  Musgrave	   focuses	   on	   the	   way	   in	  
which	  sectarian	  tensions	  affect	  regional	  geopolitics	  and	  relations	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
the	  Arab	  Springs.	  She	  does	  so	  by	  looking	  at	  Hamas’	  historical	  disinclinations	  towards	  
sectarianism,	   and	   at	   accusations	   of	   displaying	   sectarian	   tendencies	   moved	   to	   the	  
group	  after	  2011.	  May	  Darwich	  and	  Tamirace	  Fakhoury	  offer	  a	  comparative	  account	  
of	   the	   role	   of	   sectarianism	  within	   external	   behaviour	   of	   actors	   at	   a	   regional	   level.	  
Focussing	   upon	   Hizballah	   and	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   their	   piece	   offers	   an	   important	  
discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  sectarian	  difference	  within	  foreign	  policy,	  whilst	  combining	  
it	  with	  a	  securitization	  approach.	  	  
	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  8	  chapters	  provide	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  engaging	  with	  
the	   question	   of	   sectarianism	   in	   the	   Middle	   East.	   It	   involves	   challenging	   the	  
ontological	  and	  epistemological	  assumptions	  that	  have	  defined	  the	  region	  within	  the	  
academy,	   but	   shows	   the	   potential	   for	   other	   approaches	   to	   illuminate	   the	   region.	  
Whilst	  contested,	  sectarianism	  can	  remain	  a	  useful	  conceptual	  tool	  through	  which	  to	  
understand	  different	  aspects	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics,	  yet	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  not	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